Political
and cultural developments in India over the last
few decades have had the effect of forcefully
challenging, in several ways, the broad and absorptive
idea of Indian identity that emerged in the days
of the Independence movement and which helped
define the concept of the Indian nation. If we
believe that there is something of value in that
inheritance, there is a need to understand more
clearly precisely why it is valuable, and also
examine how that recognition can be articulated
I
shall take as my starting point Rabindranath Tagore's
remarkable claim that the "idea of India"
itself militates "against the intense consciousness
of the separateness of one's own people from others."
Note that there are two distinct implications
of this claim. First, internally within India,
it argues against an intense consciousness of
separated culture and the privileging of one religious
community over the others, and also more generally,
of any one group vis-à-vis the others in any principle
of classification (such as caste, class, gender,
or region). Second, externally in relation to
the world, Tagore's claim argues against the intense
consciousness of the separateness of Indians from
others in the world, and it also rejects seeing
Indian culture as fail and fragile - to be protected
through isolation from outside influences.
Tagore's
claim involves, therefore, an integrative message
- internally as well as externally - and it proposes
an inclusionary and absorptive form for the idea
of Indian identity. This inclusionary claim has
been seriously challenged in recent decades through
the advocacy of internal as well as external separatism.
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On
the philosophical side, we must first examine,
if only briefly, the general nature of identity
as a concept. The subject of identity in general,
and social identity in particular has been something
of a philosophical battleground in recent years,
partly because of the global skirmished related
to identity politics and communitarian philosophy.
The debates have often been so unstructured that
I must say that it is not really a delight to
enter this battleground. However, these general
issues have to be addressed before we proceed
to examine the demands of Indian identity in particular.
Discretion, alas, need not always be the better
part of valour.
The
importance of the idea of identity can scarcely
be doubted. It is of central relevance in understanding
a diverse basket of practical problems, as varied
as violence in former Yugoslavia or Rwanda, racial
discrimination in America or anti-immigrant violence
in West Europe, the current controversies surrounding
the idea of being British in a multi-ethnic Britain,
not to mention the growing appeal of fundamentalism
in Asia and Africa.
Our
behaviour and our commitments are deeply influenced
by the way we identify with some people and not
with others. It is, however important to be clear
about the demands of the idea of identity. In
particular, we have to resist, I have argued elsewhere,
two unfounded but often implicitly invoked assumptions:
one, the presumption that we must have a single
- or at least a principal and dominant - identity;
and two, the supposition that we "discover'
rather than choose our identity.
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The
issues of plurality and of choice are immensely
relevant to the understanding and analysis of
the idea of Indian identity. In arguing for an
inclusionary form of the Indian identity, Tagore
or Gandhi did not deny the presence and contingent
importance of other identities. Rather, in the
context of political coherence, social living
and cultural interactions, both emphasised the
fact that the Indian identity could nto favour
any particular group over others within India.
Tagore
was different from Gandhi in having a less conventional
view of his Hindu identity, and indeed in his
The Religion of Man, pointed also to the fact
that his family was the product of "a confluence
of three cultures, Hindu, Mohammedan and British."
Gandhiji's Hindu identity was sharper, and he
held regular prayer meetings, in a largely Hindu
form (even though other religions were also invoked).
But Gandhi did not differ from Tgore in seeing
no contradiction between a strongly Hindu identity
and an overwhelming commitment to an Indian identity
in political and social matters. Indeed, Gandhiji
gave his life to a great extent because of his
commitment to the latter, in the hands of someone
with a simpler view of the congruence of Indian
and Hindu identities.
*********
I
argued earlier that bother philosophical and historical
issues are involved in the idea of an Indian identity.
It may be thought that the discussion so far has
been less historical than would be necessary,
in order to resolve such questions as the relation
between a Hindu identity and an Indian identity
So I must now take up some historical questions
I do this with some hesitation, since after my
opening address at the last Indian History Congress
in January, no less an authority than the Director
of the Indian council of Historical research was
reported in the papers as having said that I must
not speak on history since I am not an historian.
I take the point, but I must confess to being
a repeated offender, and not just in history.
I had to give the opening address also at the
last Indian Sociological Congress without having
a degree in sociology, have foolhardily lectured
in law at Oxford, Yale and Chicago without a degree
in law, have shamelessly been a professor of philosophy
at Harvard for a decade without a degree in philosophy,
and I am afraid I am somewhat determined to speak
on history today without a degree in history (but
hopefully with the kind indulgence of the ICHR)
Those
who argue that the Indian identity has to be in
some way derivative on Hindu identity point out
not only that the Hindus constitute a large majority
of people in this country, but also that historically
Hinduism has been the mainstay of the Indian civilization.
There is clearly some substance in this argument,
and the counter arguments can be considered only
after the basic facts of the case have been recognised.
There
are three distinct issues here, of which the first
is not concerned directly with history at all.
As I have already argued, identity is not a matter
of discovery-of history any more than of the present
- and has to be chosen with reasoning. Even if
it were the case that Indian history were primarily
Hindu history, we still would have to determine
how a pluralist and multi-religious population
can share an Indian identity without sharing the
same religion. This, of course, is the basis of
secularism in India, and our reasoning about priorities
in dealing with competing conceptions of Indian
identity need not be parasitic on history. The
makers of the Indian constitution recognised that
fully, as did the United States in adopting a
largely secular constitution for a mostly Christian
population. The need to reason and choose cannot
be given over to the observation of history, and
this point relates to a more general claim I have
tried to defend elsewhere - in a lecture to the
Asiatic Society entitled 'On Interpreting India's
Past' - arguing that while we cannot live without
history, we need not live within it either.
The
second point is more historical. India has been
a multi-religious country for a very long time.
Aside from the obvious and prominent presence
of Muslims in India for well over a millennium
(Muslim Arab traders started settling in what
is now Kerala from the eighth century), India
has had Christians from at least the fourth century,
Jews from the time of the fall of Jerusalem, Parsis
from the seventh century, and Sikh from the time
that religion was born. Also, pre-Muslim India
was not, as it is sometimes claimed, mainly a
Hindu country, since Buddhism was the dominant
religion in India for many hundreds of years and
Jainism has also had an equally long history and
in fact,a large continuing presence. Since there
is so much discussion these days against Hindus
converting to any other religion, it is perhaps
worth remembering that arguably the greatest emperor
of India was Ashoka in the third century BC (the
main rival to Ashoka's claim would be from a Muslim
called Akbar), and that Ashoka did convert to
Buddhism from what would have been the-then form
of Hinduism.
I
come now to the third reason against making the
Indian identity dependent on the Hindu identity.
Hindus are defined in two quite distinct ways.
When the number of Hindus is counted, and it is
established that the vast majority of Indians
are in fact Hindu, this is not a counting of religious
belief, but essentially of ethnic background.
But when generalisations are made about, say,
the divinity of Rama or the sacred status of The
Ramayana, beliefs are involved. By using the two
approaches together, a numerical picture is constructed
in which it is supposed that a vast majority of
Indians believe in the divinity of Rama and the
sacred status of The Ramayana. For a large proportion
of the Hindus, however, that attribution would
be just a mistake, since millions of people who
are defined as Hindu in the first approach do
not share these beliefs which is central to the
second approach
Indeed,
by making this attribution, the champions of Hindu
politics undermine the rich tradition of heterodoxy
that has been so central to the history of the
Hindu culture. It is not often recognised that
Sanskrit (including Pali and Prakrit) has a larger
literature in the atheistic and agnostic tradition
than exists in any other classical language. In
the fourteenth century, Madhavacharya's remarkable
book called Sarvadar-shanasamgraha ('the collection
of all philosophies') which has one chapter each
on the major schools of Hindu belief, devoted
the entire first chapter to arguments in favour
of the atheistic position.
The
route to Indian identity via a Hindu identity
does not, I would argue, survive critical scrutiny
for each of these three reasons. They point firmly
towards a broader and inclusionary understanding
of the Indian identity - much in line with the
views of Tagore and Gandhi.