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Changing
India's corporate culture
Outlook - January 2000
Prodded by economic reforms, Indian companies
have undergone an often painful transformation. But
as this business leader explains, much more work needs
to be done to make them truly competitive
After
a half century of protectionism, during which even the
manufacture of safety pins was tightly regulated, India
threw open its doors to both domestic and international
competition in 1991. Since then the changes have been
dramatic.
While the Indian economy as a
whole has grown at an average rate of more than 5% annually
in this period, many larger companies have seen their
fortunes decline precipitously (although weak bankruptcy
laws and cumbersome liquidation procedures make going
out of the business virtually impossible). These days
a far more telling indicator of the changing Indian
economy can be found at the Bombay Stock Exchange, where
trading is dominated by technology-oriented start-ups
in industries like computer software and pharmaceuticals.
These have replaced the likes of cement and steel stocks,
highly favoured sectors during the protectionist era
of the "License Raj".
One of the few traditional Indian
groups to survive the brutal consequences of the nine-year
reform programme is Tata Sons, the country's largest
business group and an industrial power for more than
100 years. The group is a conglomerate of 80 operating
companies, with interests as diverse as steel, trucks,
cars, cement, ball bearings, hotels, oil drilling, construction,
telecommunications, fertiliser and earthmoving equipment.
The newest jewel in the Tata
crown is the Indica, the first passenger care wholly
manufactured in India. The company introduced the car
in early 1999, without the benefit of an international
auto-maker as a partner; advance orders for the Indica
have kept assembly lines running overtime for a year.
Tata has also made forays outside
of heavy industry. Indeed, the fact that computer software
is the fastest growing industry in India today is due
in no small measure to Tata Consultancy Services, the
country's largest and most successful software company,
with 1998 export sales of nearly $400 million.
Ratan Tata, who took over as
Chairman of the group the year the reforms were introduced,
has been credited with having successfully steered the
company through a particularly traumatic period. Economic
reform, with its new emphasis on competition, presented
the unwieldy agglomeration of companies with what Tata
calls "the very daunting task of defining what
our core business is."
In his effort to remake the group
in the face of this challenge, Tata reconstituted the
board of the parent holding company to reflect the younger
team, initiated the process of selling off a number
of businesses, ended several international partnerships
and beat back some determined competition from the Japanese
in the trucking industry. Tata also tried, unsuccessfully,
to get three successive governments to agree to his
plans to set up a domestic airline in partnership with
Singapore Airlines.
Likely to be unveiled in the
new century is what could easily be the biggest foreign
acquisition by an Indian company: a pending take-over
of Tetley, the UK-based tea bag company, by Tata Tea,
which is expected to cost about $400 million.
Though the reforms have been
painful, the 62-years-old Tata, who studied architecture
at Cornell University, seems to have welcomed them.
Reflecting on what changes have meant to India, he told
Outlook, that Indian businesses "cannot turn to
the government for protection. I think there should
be some soul-searching on how they should play in the
new competitive environment." For his part, this
means an ongoing pursuit of a leaner corporate structure,
which he hopes to have in place early in 2000.
In a rare interview, Tata spent
an hour at his Bombay headquarters with N Radhakrishnan,
a business journalist, talking about the effects of
the reform programme on industry, and about what doing
business in India will mean in the future - for companies
within and outside the country.
Economic reforms were introduced
in 1991. From the point of view of Indian industry,
what else needs to be done?
We have seen considerable reform in industrial licensing.
Entry barriers and red tape have been erased. But fiscal
reform and reforms in company law have not yet happened.
The same holds for labour legislation.
Have the reform fundamentally
alerted the corporate culture in India?
I think the environment has become more competitive.
That has made Indian industry more concerned with a)
its customers, b) the quality of its products, and c)
its brand image in the marketplace.
Have Indian companies generally
done well in this newly competitive environment?
In the last couple of years, companies have found themselves
going through a very difficult period. They have had
to cut costs and be more mindful of inventory levels.
By and large, Indian industry did not worry about things
of this nature earlier. Companies were in a seller's
market. They could maximise production and very often
pass on the inefficiencies to the consumer through higher
prices. That (mentality) is under pressure now, and
I think that is a good thing.
And individual companies?
Some have supported the reform process, while others
have only paid lip service to it, seeking protection
behind the scenes. Many new companies have come to the
fore because they have made a fresh start and didn't
carry any baggage. They have often come with new technology
that is more advanced than what others have. That does
not mean that all the others are falling by the wayside.
Some have, while others have risen to the occasion.
So, how will many of these
companies survive if they don't have the necessary skills
or resources?
What is the alternative, if they don't open up? The
easiest option is not to open up, to build walls - but
that carries a cost to consumers. Another alternative
is to open up selectively, but this is very subjective.
One person's raw material is another person's finished
product.
There is another way - perhaps the most painful way
- and that is to open up fully: The strong live and
the weak die. There is some bloodshed, and out of it
emerges a much leaner industry, which tends to survive.
I often ask myself, what happened in a country like
Spain? It had its own industry. Now big brands operate
there, but local brands found their own niches. They
might not be big, but they are strong.
Is there anything peculiarly
Indian that could threaten survival?
One of the weaknesses of Indian industry is that in
many areas - like consumer goods - it is very fragmented.
Individually, the companies might not be able to survive.
What is needed is a consortium of like companies in
one industry, presenting a strong front to the multinationals.
The Swiss watch industry did this.
At Tatas, we believe that is we are not among the top
three in an industry, we should look seriously at what
it would take to become one of the top three players
- or think about exiting the industry.
How would you rate the performance
of your own group? Has the emerging business environment
led to a new paradigm in terms of management thinking
and practices?
New demands are being made on the group companies in
a variety of areas. For the first time they are being
confronted with a new set of performance criteria. The
Tatas are rising to the occasion, but we have a long
way to go.
There is awareness both within
individual companies and in the group that we need to
force the change. It would be pompous of me to say that
there is a new paradigm. Changes are always slow and
painful. And this has been happening at a time of great
economic difficulty. I think that in the longer term,
we will see a considerable change in the way Tata companies
look at their operations.
Tata Tea made a bid of around
$400 million for Tetley, the world's second-largest
tea bag company. It is the first time an Indian company
has made a bid of this size. Is this the beginning of
a new way of thinking within the group?
The strategy is to acquire a brand with an international
presence. Tetley has a strong position in tea bags,
and we have a strong position in tea. So it enables
us to promote our product through a brand that is known
in the western world. It would have taken much more
effort and much more money to create the same level
of awareness for the Tata Tea brand overseas.
What kind of challenges does
this present for your managers?
If you think globally, you will have to look at global
managers as well. It is conceivable that Tetley will
be managed not by Indians but by managers in the country
of operations, who know the market better.
In general, as a group, we have been very inward looking,
seeing only India as our market. We have not focused
adequately on growing overseas. Part of (the reason)
was due to foreign exchange restrictions. Now that these
restrictions have been eased extensively, we should
be looking at growing overseas in a serious manner.
By growing overseas, I don't mean just exporting our
products but looking at acquisitions, alliances and
things of this nature.
Should Indian industry employ
this as part of its growth strategy?
Not as a whole, but I would say that in selective industries
we should. There are some industries in which India
can play a significant global role. Indian companies
should look seriously at having a presence in other
countries - by acquisitions or by establishing their
own manufacturing facilities or marketing presence.
Software and information technology is one industry
that comes to mind immediately.
On the domestic front, your
joint ventures and alliances with international companies
have followed a seemingly curious pattern. You are in
the process of parting, or have already parted ways,
with Unisys, IBM, Mercedes Benz India and Bell Canada.
Ventures with Cummins, Lucent, BP and Honeywell continues
to prosper. What is the logic that drives your joint
ventures?
As you grow and want to enter a new business, what you
have to ask yourself is you have the time, the technology
and the resources to build the business from scratch.
In a high tech business, you have to ask whether you
have the capability to not only introduce new technology
but to upgrade constantly. That often means you need
(either) the necessary investment and scale to amortise
the investment, or a partner in the industry that has
the product and technology. That has been our driving
logic in joining hands with IBM, Lucent or Honeywell.
In most case, I can say that the Tata companies are
long-term players in partnerships. But unfortunately,
after they get established, many multinational companies
want to become majority stakeholders, or win the company.
Our policy has been that we won't be passive investors;
we always go for an equal partnership. And if the pressures
(from the joint venture partners) are strong, then [we
have them buy us out], or we buy them out.
In your car venture, you decided
to go it alone even though most people thought that
you would be better off with a partner.
I said that we would collaborate only in areas where
we don't have a presence. We were already in the automotive
industry, but not in cars. I was convinced that we had
the basic capabilities to develop and manufacture a
car. We didn't have all the technology, but we could
obtain it. We would have taken a partner who was willing
to jointly produce a car but who didn't want a stake
in Telco (Tata Son's truck-maker, which produces the
new car). But every car company we spoke to wanted a
joint venture in which they would have ownership. That
would have meant two negatives for Telco. One, the joint
venture would have been off Telco' s books. Two, history
shows that after a product is established, the partner
wants to increase its stake to a majority holding. For
these reasons, we went alone.
Many observers fear that India
does not have a sufficiently large managerial pool to
match the needs of the country's rapid industrial growth.
What has been your experience?
There are many competent professionals in the country
who have not been given the chance to operate at CEO
levels. If you look around, you see companies run professionally
by people who 15 years ago were virtually unknown. Therefore,
though there are a lot of managers around, the question
is whether you are willing to take a chance with someone
you don't know well.
Can you envision Indian companies
employing foreign managers to run
their operations?
At Indian Hotels (a Tata Company), we have an English
manager running a Delhi hotel. We should not be afraid
of saying that we are an Indian company if we [are]
run by an English manager any more than an American
company should be concerned about its identity if it
chooses an Indian CEO.
Indian companies feared that
once the economy was opened up, the multinationals would
take over - first, Indian markets; eventually, Indian
companies. In hindsight, do you think this fear was
justified?
I think some of that is true. The counter for Indian
companies against the take-over threat is a high market
capitalisation, which makes the price of the take-over
expensive. Or the existing shareholders could rally
around and vote against the take-over. For many Indian
companies, both seem difficult propositions.
How should companies themselves
be responding?
If an Indian company that was in the predominant position
before the multinationals came in suddenly finds its
market eroded, it says something about the way that
company took the market for granted. But I think there
certainly is a challenge from multinationals that have
established brands, large budgets from promotions and
mature products.
I have a view that is probably
not very popular with many of my counterparts: They
are not running the economy for themselves but rather
for the consumers. They should not turn to the government
for protection. I think there should be some soul-searching
on how they should play in the new competitive environment.
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