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A
man for the '90s
Business
World January 1990
Strategic planning should be an
ongoing exercise, not a one-off thing. Today, therefore,
we are making another effort and taking a relook at
the possibilities open to us in the light of our potentials.
In
the sea of new faces churned up by the flowering of
Indian capitalism in the eighties, his could well have
been lost. It was, amidst the mega-industrialists, super
whizkids and crony capitalists thrown up by the Rajiv
era, he would have stuck out like a sore thumb. And
in the rapidly thickening crowd of businessmen trying
to thrust themselves into the limelight, he would have
been elbowed back long ago.
But
the chances are that in the nineties the limelight will
seek out Ratan Naval Tata, Chairman of Telco, Tata Industries
and a number of other Tata companies, and perhaps, the
man who will ultimately step into patriarch J.R.D. Tata's
shoes.
On
the face of it, Ratan Tata doesn't appear to have much
going for him in the form of a track record. A long
association with Nelco, whose patchy performance over
the years has had Tata observers shaking their heads
in disappointment. A shorter, but even more fruitless
association with Empress Mills - which ended up at the
industrial morgue couple of years ago. True, he played
midwife to clutch of seven hi-tech companies, but thus
far the potential of these has overshadowed actual performance.
And then, when he took over as chairman of the second
largest company in the Tata stable - Telco - he presided
over the most disastrous industrial relations slide
in the group's recent history. Admits Tata honestly
: "The company has perhaps taken the workers for
granted for too long. As a result much distrust has
sprung up."
But
the negative side of Ratan Tata's ledger is more apparent
than real. And for that, the key lies in his personality.
Self-effacing, unassuming and essentially a shy, shy
man, Ratan Tata positively squirms under the arc lights.
Switch them off, and he comes through as a straightforward,
honest and thinking individual. Just the kind of person
you would entrust the destiny of India's largest business
house (1988-89 gross sales: Rs. 8,413 crore) to.
At
this stage, it must be clarified that Ratan Tata is
only the apparent, in the house of Tata. As JRD himself
made it clear some time back, while his nephew (i.e.
Ratan) shared his own values, the chairmanship of Tata
Sons, the apex organisation, was an elective one. Thus,
after JRD, the board would not have a chairman thrust
on it; it would choose its own head. That is why a track
record matters, more particulars for a media-shy Ratan.
What has been his real contribution to the house of
Tatas as things stand today?
Rejuvenation
of Tata Industries would probably figure at the top
of the list. Tata Industries, which went moribund in
1969 after the abolition of the managing agency system,
was turned into a vehicle for the promotion of new,
hi-tech industries with Ratan Tata at the helm.
As
author of the group's strategic plan in 1983, Ratan
Tata has certainly established that he has vision. True,
the plan has been kept in mind only by the companies
actually under Ratan's charge, but it proved remarkably
prescient as far as predicting the future was concerned.
Among other things, it forecast joint sector projects
as the way to grow - and that was long before the government
began thinking along those lines. Meanwhile, a new strategic
plan is in the making for the nineties.
He
has built bridges to government, having realised that,
in ultimate analysis, government and industry must work
together. Hence his willingness to chair Air India (though
he has since put in his papers) and work with informal
government advisory groups (like the Planning Commission
group on R and D, chaired by V. Krishnamurthy of Sail).
But Ratan Tata has not used these bridges to curry short-term
favour for himself or his companies. Unlike the Ambanis
and Oswals, for whom changes in government bring untold
uncertainty, the Tatas face no such internal tremors.
The
Tata plan for the nineties could well be the blueprint
to hold the Tata group together in the post-JRD era.
Unlike JRD, who holds the group together by sheer weight
of personality and respect built over 50 years of chairmanship,
Ratan has no such advantage. He may well step into JRD's
place when there are several other Tata titans with
greater claims to empire. Sensibly, Ratan's focus is
clear: to keep it "more structured in terms of
a central core plan."
To
be sure, even without all these amorphous achievements,
Ratan Tata has formal and adequate clout within the
group to make him the senior most director in the group
after JRD. For, apart from being chairman of Tata Industries
and the companies it promoted, he is also chairman of
Nelco, and since late 1988, Telco too, which he took
over after Sumant Moolgaokar relinquised charge shortly
before his death. Tata is also vice-chairman of Tata
Steel, Tata Chemicals and Tata Power.
For
all that, Ratan began his career at the Tatas unpretentiously
enough. After obtaining degrees in engineering and architecture
in the US, he returned to India, proceeded to Jamshedpur,
worked first on the shopfloor, and later as an engineer.
His first real independent charge was with the National
Radio and Electronics Co. Ltd. (i.e. Nelco).
Nelco
was clearly a sick child in the Tata stable when Ratan
Tata became director-in-charge in the mid-seventies.
The company had not been able to hold its own in the
very competitive market for radios, and seemed to lack
any kind of strategic direction. Both S.K. (Bobby) Mukherjee,
Nelco's current managing director, and Raju Bhinge,
who had put in a good 12 years with the company before
moving on to become one of the powerful "backroom
boys" at Tata Industries, feel that Ratan Tata's
main contribution at Nelco has been to give the company
the sense of direction it sorely needed (see BW cover
feature,11-24 April, 1988).
Rewards
of patience
The company's industrial systems division was started
under Tata's lead, and for some years now, it has needed
nursing and protection. All through the seventies, turnover
stagnated at around Rs. 60 lakh per year, but now, with
the figure around Rs. 25 crores annually, Nelco seems
set to reap the rewards of patience. In the future,
industrial systems could provide a cushion against the
sharp oscillations between profits and losses that Nelco's
other divisions have seen in yester years.
A
Rs. 6 crore order from Tata Steel (for its new bar and
rod mill) has been executed successfully, with technology
obtained from Westinghouse. On hand is a much larger
new order of Rs. 120 crore, also from Tisco, for its
hot strip mill, with a three-year delivery schedule.
Technology for this is being sourced from General Electric
of the US. Mukherjee is completely unapologetic about
the "in-house" Tisco order. "Nelco fought
tooth-and-ail against giants such as Bhel and finally
won because the company's offer must have scored both
in terms of technology as well as price," he says.
Another Rs. 13 crore contract has been obtained from
Hindustan Development Corporation, which makes railway
track equipment and structurals, and Mukherjee is hopeful
about competing in bids for the new private sector steel
plants being put up by Essar and others. Nelco has,
in the meanwhile, withdrawn from radios, and the entertainment
electronics division has concentrated entirely on television
sets. The company's great achievement in recent years
has been to build up a respectable share in a fiercely
competitive market, and this success has certainly come
as a morale-booster. Profits, however, tend to remain
wafer-thin, and since TVs constitute a "stand alone"
activity for the company (unlike competitors like BPL
or Videocon, who are opting for video manufacture),
the vulnerability remains. Moreover, annual growth in
the TV market, which was going along at a pretty 30percent
to 40percent in the past few years, has now plateaued
off.
Nelco's
ups and downs, and its hesitant success, have sometimes
been held against Ratan Tata, but those who have worked
with him, both insiders at Nelco as well as well-informed
outside observers, strongly dispute any such suggestion.
In the first place, they say, Ratan Tata inherited an
organisation which was in a shambles - and his role
as a chairman was a non-executive one. He had to find
suitable professionals, and virtually start from scratch.
A
fresh infusion of equity funds two years ago has helped.
Today the company is certainly out of the woods, has
managed to wipe off all its accumulated losses, and
annual turnover is nuzzling Rs. 100 crore.
Unfortunately,
another Tata basket case which got landed in Ratan Tata's
lap in 1977, Empress Mills, just could not be saved.
Not for lack of trying, though. When Ratan Tata took
charge of the Empress, the organised sector cotton textile
industry was not far from being in the worst shape every,
though possibly Datta Samant's indefinite strike dealt
the final body blow. Competition from powerlooms had
made a large number of companies unviable, including
those like the Empress which had large labour contingents
and had spent too little on modernisation. On Tata's
insistence, some investment was made, but it was really
a case of too little, too late. Bombay House, the Tata
headquarters, was clearly unwilling to divert large
funds from other group companies into an undertaking
which would need to be nursed for a long time. And with
the market for coarse and medium cotton cloth (which
was all that the Empress produced) turning more and
more adverse, the Empress went into an inevitable financial
tailspin.
The
Empress closure in 1986 perhaps brought home to the
senior directors at Bombay house what had been clear
to Ratan Tata for quite a while: that the group's lack
of cohesiveness was turning into a major disability.
Thus, while the Birlas bailed out Jay Shree Textiles
through a merger with India Rayon and the Bangurs arrived
at a similar arrangement between Hastings Jute Mills
and Shree Digvijay Cement, very little of such "blue-sky
thinking" could be done for the Empress. Perhaps,
some lessons were learnt, and with ACC, the Tatas have
reasserted control in 1988.
Despite the common impression that Tata shareholdings
in group companies are at very low levels, this is not
quite true except in the case of the Tata Electric.
Companies and Tata Steel (and even in the case of the
latter, group shareholding has been increased to 8percent
after the recent convertible debenture issue). In most
other companies, shareholding is at a pretty respectable
level, ranging between 20percent-40percent. But notwithstanding
this, and despite JRD's strong personality which upholds
Tata "values", group companies have been unable
to pull together because of a lack of clear strategic
direction at the centre, to which all the powerful chiefs
subscribe.
The
Tata Plan evolved under Ratan Tata's guidance in 1983,
made an attempt to remedy this. It didn't work, for
many of the operating chief saw the Tata Plan as an
encroachment on their independence. But today, at the
end of the eighties, the changed business environment
may prompt greater cooperation. At any rate, Ratan Tata
is engaged in overseeing a fresh exercise to determine
Tata strategy for the nineties, which may, however,
concentrate more on the companies under his own charge.
In
fact, the only part of the 1983 plan which was implemented
with some degree of completeness was in the ventures
that were promoted under the wing of Tata Industries,
the "seven sisters": Tata Telecom, Tata Keltron,
Hitech Drilling Services, Tata Honeywell, Tata Elxsi,
Plantek, and Tata Finance. It is worth briefly looking
at each of these companies.
Tata
Telecom, which has under taken a Rs. 10 crore EPABX
project at Gandhinagar, Gujarat, has a capacity to produce
50,000 lines per annum with technology from Oki of Japan.
It broke even in the very first year of operations.
In the nine-month period between July 1988 and March
1989, the company earned a Rs. 16 lakh profit, after
all charges, on a sales turnover of Rs. 12.5 crore.
In the current financial year, turnover is expected
to be in the region of Rs. 20 crore, with a bottomline
to match. Orders worth about Rs. 15 crore are in hand
- i.e. nine months' production - which is comfortable
enough for a consumer product where the lead period
for delivery cannot be more than one or two months.
The company intends to also apply for the manufacture
of fax systems, paging systems, and perhaps main switching
systems, under licence from C-DoT.
Tata
Keltron, the second telecommunications company in the
fold, is a joint venture between Tata Industries and
the Kerala government. It is a Rs. 6 crore project with
technical collaboration from Siemens for the manufacture
of telephone instruments. The Keltron tieup was made
at a time when licences were not being given to the
private sector, and so the joint sector route was chosen.
In retrospect, perhaps, it might have been better if
Tata Telecom had got the licence to make telephone instruments
as well so that a duplication of space, facilities and
machines in two different projects might have been avoided.
Tata Keltron depends on the Mahanagar Telephone Nigam
and the department of telecommunications for orders.
Consequently, margins have not been too good. While
the company has made a Rs. 65 lakh cumulative loss in
the first two years, the future is expected to be better.
HiTech
Drilling Services has technical as well as financial
collaboration with Schlumberger. Two oil-drilling rigs
have been installed at Bombay High at a cost of Rs.
40 crores, with a 1:4 financial leverage, and the purchase
of a third rig is being negotiated. In the first three
years of operation, the company has made cash profits,
and current prospects are such that margins should improve.
Since payments for technical services (in the form of
foreign personnel) constitute a large chunk of costs,
the company is training its own personnel.
Tata
Honeywell has a shareholding pattern similar to HiTech
Drilling - 40percent with the Tatas, 40percent with
the foreign collaborator and 20percent with the public.
The Rs. 6 crore project, involving the manufacture of
process control equipment at Pune, has recently gone
on stream. The company also proposes to trade in Honeywell
products in India. Tata Elxsi is still an unrealised
potential. Elxsi was a US company in which the Tatas
got involved at the venture capital stage, with the
understanding that the south-east Asian market would
be theirs. Recently, the company discontinued operations
in the US and shifted based to Singapore Elxsi systems
are super mini computers and Tata Elxsi, Singapore,
currently has a $10 million turnover.
Elxsi
systems should have adequate niche markets in the Far
East and in India. An Indian venture may be established,
perhaps with a Rs. 15 crore project cost, for the manufacture
of parts which can be sourced competitively from this
country.
Plantek,
also in Singapore, is a joint venture between two Japanese
companies, Sumitomo and Kuo Hako. Native Plants of the
US, and the Tatas. In common with other biotechnology
firms worldwide, it has promised a lot, but the results
are yet to come in. As with Elxsi, Plantek could be
the knowhow source for a separate Indian venture.
The
companies promoted by Tata Industries are not likely
to make super-profits, but then this was certainly not
the primary objective. The idea was really to have a
forward view, and establish a presence in areas which
are likely to grow in the future and pay off in the
long run. Notwithstanding the fact that ever collectively
the turnover of the "seven sisters" is a small
drop in the Tata ocean, one thing is undeniable. Tata
Industries today is a rather different organisation
from the moribund company that Ratan Tata took over
7 group of around 10 highly charged executives have
managed to implement six projects in five years - which
is no mean achievement. The share capital of the company
has been increased from Rs. 50 lakh to Rs. 7.5 crore
through the issue of shares to Tata group companies
and the net worth stands at over Rs. 9 crore. The company's
investment portfolio, if valued at market prices today,
would be over Rs. 40 crore.
Nevertheless,
there are some drawbacks in the company's present structure.
As a catalytic investment company, the skeleton structure
could be acceptable. But since Tata Industries is not
an operating company, it lacks the ability to create
systems in the new companies promoted by it, or perhaps
cross-subsidise the long-gestation projects through
its financial muscle. Again, manpower training perhaps
has to be duplicated in all the new companies, and pre-operative
expenses can be high. It has been an entirely different
matter when Tisco, Indian Hotels, or Tata Chemicals
have promoted new ventures.
The
great advantage of being in charge of a large, established
and operating company is obvious. This honour came to
Ratan Tata only late last year with Telco, when Sumant
Moolgaokar relinquished charge in Tata's favour shortly
before his death. Telco continues to enjoy dominance
in heavy commercial vehicles with about a 75percent
market share. Moreover, the company has also demonstrated
its technical versatility by launching various models
of light commercial vehicles models of light commerical
vehicles in quick succession all through 1987 and 1988,
and would have, by this time, if labour troubles had
not intervened at its Pune factory, also launched the
Tata Estate car.
But
problems remain. Telco's 1210 medium commercial vehicle
(the most popular truck in India) is basically a dated
model, even though the company has made countless improvements
upon the Benz original. International standards call
for much higher levels of quality and even domestic
competition - from Ashok Leyland and the Mahindras -
is shaping up.
The
twin challenges that Ratan Tata faces at Telco are,
therefore, clear: first, on the human relations front,
to bridge the gap of suspicion between labour and management;
and second, on the technical side, to aim for new targets
of excellence.
As
far technological improvements are concerned, Moolgaokar,
before this passing away, had already indicated the
way. Exciting plans are in hand to have a fresh tieup
with Daimler Benz (the company's collaborators till
the early seventies, and which still retains a 11percent
shareholding). The idea is to make an international
standard medium commercial vehicle entirely for export.
Daimler's interest in this is obvious - manufacturing
costs in Germany are too high for it to compete against
the Japanese in overseas markets; so is Telco's interest
- new, rigorous technical standards will have to be
set and internalised.
Pact
with Benz
After long and detailed confabulations abroad, an understanding
has been reached. The project involves the manufacture
of an entirely new vehicle, which has not been launched
even in Germany and parts of whose design are still
in the conceptual stage. The vehicle is expected to
be ready only in 1991. The other international source
that the Germans want to develop is their own subsidiary
in Brazil.
Capital
investment of about Rs. 60-100 crore will be made at
Jamshedpur - and it will be an unequalled opportunity
for Telco to modernise and upgrade its facilities at
this location. Moreover, the company will be able to
adapt component parts of the new vehicle (whether engine,
transmission or gear box) to its 1210 vehicle after
payment of a royalty to Daimler. The 1210 would then,
by the mid-nineties, be comparable to any world class
vehicle. And finally, Telco will be able to achieve
higher exports, upwards of 8,000 numbers per year against
3,000 at present.
As
far as the labour situation in Pune is concerned, Ratan
Tata has clearly inherited an unsatisfactory legacy.
While Sumant Moolgaokar never neglected human relations
- in fact, he was an exceptional builder of people -
his real passion was for technology. In his latter years,
with failing health, Moolgaokar left a great deal to
other people and concentrated on his chief interest.
A
company as large as Telco (with over 37,000 people in
Pune and Jamshedpur) needs as visible leader - and unfortunately,
Moolgaokar's advanced years made this impossible. With
the entry of Ratan Tata, however, there is expected
to be a distinct change for the company in the months
to come.
The
problem about the two rival trade unions persists. While
Rajan Nair, who leads the Telco Kamgar Sanghatana, withdrew
his strike in November, his influence is still powerful
and the other trade union is perceived as a creation
of the management. This again is a flowover from the
past. But Tata is quite categorical: pitting unions
against each other is a game he will not play.
In
his working life so far, Ratan Tata has always had a
plateful of problems, whether at the Empress, Nelco
or more recently at Telco. But even if he hasn't always
been successful, the point to underscore is that he
hasn't shied away from tough assignments. The nineties
could bring in more of the same as industry - including
the Tatas - grapples with the problems of cut-throat
internal competition, the export challenge and a tougher
operating environment.
As
Indian capitalism matures in the nineties, the crony
capitalists and charlatan industrialists will have to
yield to the more value-driven clan of businessmen.
Men who offer value to shareholders, the employees,
the economy and the society at large.
By
that yardstick, Ratan Tata is a man for the nineties.
_____________________________________________________________
The Name Isn't All
In any other business group, the surname alone would
have guaranteed heir-apparent status to Ratan Tata.
But the Tatas have always prided themselves in being
different. First, the ownership of their companies is
chiefly held through public charitable trusts established
by the founder's sons: and, second, the group proudly
claims that professionalism has always had overriding
importance vis-a-vis formal control via shareholding.
To some degree, the second claim
is borne out. The late Suman Moolgaokar created Telco,
and was its chairman for many long years. Similarly,
Darbari Seth created Tata Chemicals and he is its CEO,
as is the case with Ajit Kerkar, who transformed Indian
Hotels. And Russi Mody's contribution in making Tisco
what it is today needs no reiteration. All these people
have been rewarded by group chief J.R.D. Tata with chairmanships
in each of their companies.
Fiefdoms
The obverse side of the coin is clear: to a degree,
it has meant the creation of "fiefdoms." And,
in an era when the managing agency system has long been
abolished, the chairmanship of Tata Sons (the apex Tata
holding company) has tended to become, with JRD, more
of a symbolic role. Not surprisingly, the Tata group
has been likened by some within it to the Commonwealth,
where the British sovereign is a symbolic head.
But the parallel does not quite
hold, mainly because Tata shareholdings, contrary to
popular myth, in group companies are still quite substantial.
And where they were not (e.g. Tisco, ACC), stakes have
been upped. Thus, the generally propagated idea that
the Tatas manage their companies mostly on the merit
of their track record and not by virtue of shareholding
power, is partly untrue (see table).
It is true, however, that JRD did allow operating chiefs
a unique kind of freedom - and thus gave the opportunity
to the Darbari Seths. Ajit Kerkars, Russi Modys or A.H.
Tobaccowalas (at Voltas) to grow. However, all of them
are operating chiefs and not owner managers. Therefore,
while the Birlas or the Mafatlals or the Shrirams have
carved up their groups between different (family) constituents,
the Tata group continues to survive as a confederation,
and "group thinking", despite pulls and pressures,
is still a reality.
A leader
Group cohesion could be important in the nineties. Increasingly,
large business groups are expected to provide the impetus
for economic growth, and the suspicions which engendered
the MRTP Act are slowly being relegated to the past.
Thus, the next chief of the Tatas much not merely be
a repository of values as JRD is today (ethics, integrity,
providing value to the customer, etc.), but must also
consciously attempt a synergisation of the group's efforts.
This need not mean "central control", vested
in a single person. It simply means greater internal
cooperation, with the leader keeping in mind a picture
for the group as a whole while acting as a catalyst
within a band of very senior and responsible people,
and blending Tata interests with those of the community
at large.
JRD himself has gone on record saying that after him
his colleagues on the board of Tata Sons will elect
their own chairman. A few years ago Bombay House hearsay
would have it that N. A. Palkhivala, Russi Mody, Darbari
Seth and Ratan Tata could all be possible successors
to JRD.
Palkhivala is today no longer
in the running, but Russy Mody, as chairman of the group's
largest company, Tisco, or Darbari Seth, as a senior
person and chairman of the singularly successful Tata
Chemicals, could still be said to have a claim. But
insiders reckon that, ultimately, it will be Ratan Tata.
Integrity and vision he has had in plenty always. But
now he has the track record as well - the creation of
a new-look Nelco and the setting up of the "seven
hi-tech sisters" under the Tata Industries umbrella.
The late Moolgaokar's nomination of Ratan Tata for the
chairmanship of Telco may, therefore, be a prelude to
a more central role for him in the Tata scheme of things.
Tata Shareholding in Major
Group Companies
|
Company
|
Chairman
|
Group holding*
(per cent)
|
| Telco |
Ratan Tata |
19
|
| Tisco |
Russi Mody |
8
|
| Tata Chemicals |
Darbari Seth |
32
|
| Tata Power |
H. N. Sethna |
3
|
| Indian Hotels |
Ajit Kerkar |
41
|
| Tata Tea |
Darbari Seth |
35
|
| Voltas |
A. H. Tobaccowala |
21
|
| ACC |
N.A. Palkhivala |
10
|
| Tata Oil Mills |
H.N. Sethna |
24
|
| Forbes, Forbes Campbell
|
Fredie Mehta |
24
|
| Rallis India |
Darbari Seth |
24
|
* Includes shareholding of
Tata Sons, the trusts, and the investment companies.
Source: BW compilation.
A Plan for the Future
Ratan Tata is not the type to say 'I told you so.' But
the Tata strategic plan document drawn up in 1983 under
his supervision certainly entitles him to make the claim.
Among other things, the document foresaw that the capital
market would expand, and that raising funds for new
projects would pose few difficulties; it took into account
the possibility of intensifying competition which would
call for special efforts on the part of the low-tech
areas of Tata businesses to survive; it recommended
the joint sector route for growth long before it became
the rage; and it talked of mergers and acquisitions
at a time when Manu Chhabria of Dubai was still an unknown
figure.
Four clear strategic directions
for the future emerged from the 1983 plan:
- That the Tatas must strive
for technology-driven leadership.
- That there must be a focus
on selected product and market segments.
- That joint sector projects
must be pursued for growth in the big league.
- That synergies must be tapped
within the group.
But the plan has remained just
a paper exercise. In the last six years, there has been
little conscious effort to translate it into reality,
except in the projects promoted by Tata Industries,
of which Ratan is chairman. Through Tata Industries,
the group has managed to establish a presence in sunrise
areas and grasped business opportunities which the group
may otherwise have missed out on.
Joint sector route
Nevertheless, some of the major Tata companies have
independently pursued strategies not different from
the course recommended in the 1983 plan. The joint sector
route has been followed in Titan Watches, Tata Fertilisers,
Ipitata, the Pepsi venture with Punjab Agro Industries
and Voltas, and the proposed Karnal oil refinery under
the aegis of Tata Chemicals. Mergers and acquisitions
have also taken place: Tisco has merged Indian Tube
in it and has taken over a number of small metal or
engineering units; Tata Fertilisers has dissolved itself
into Tata Chemicals; Indian Hotels bought the President
hotel in Bombay and promoted a number of companies in
India and abroad; Tata Tea is in the process of acquiring
Consolidated Coffee; and when Pallonji Mistry finally
lost interest in ACC, the Tatas, through Darbari Seth,
scotched Nusli Wadia's bid and reasserted control in
a company which had originally been theirs. In the cases
where action was not taken in time (for example, Ratan
Tata had recommended an exit from cotton textiles),
events precipitated action and sometimes inglorious
closure, as in the Empress Mills case.
In sum, patchy implementation notwithstanding, the Tata
plan has proved its relevance. And Ratan Tata is today
quite clear that strategic planning cannot be a one-off
exercise. Hence the impetus for a new plan incorporating
the Tata vision for the nineties. Raju Bhinge (38),
a former divisional manager at Nelco, is the man in
charge of the planning exercise for the nineties.
This time around, the exercise is being done differently.
In the 1983 plan, eight business area committees had
been set up. For the nineties plan, Bhinge and his team
will concentrate on Tata Industries, to see, as Tata
puts it, "how far the company has covered its chosen
road, and how to profitably continue pursuing the goal
of hi-tech." Management pundit S. K. Bhattacharyya
will be involved as an outside consultant.
Minimising tension
As far as the Tatas as a whole are concerned, there
will be a single apex committee which will attempt an
overview. If any operating company then requires a more
systematic study or follow-through, this service will
be offered. The approach is designed to minimise any
kind of intra-group tension: the last time, some operating
companies were a little reluctant to participate in
the exercise since (they thought), it might encroach
on their independence.
Bhinge is cautious about offering any detailed description
of the exercise being undertaken for Tata Industries
simply because it is still too early. However, he has
some observations to make. "Apart from business
areas in which we have already made an entry (like biotechnology,
advanced electronics and telecom), we are thinking about
advanced materials and alternate energy sources,"
he says. "All this is fine, but we also need to
address some fundamental questions. We had earlier defined
our mission as being into hi-tech, but we should ask
ourselves, how far are we really in hi-tech? Do we need
to modify our mission, or perhaps expand it?"
Adds Bhinge, "There are areas which the Tatas as
a group are missing out on. In the immediate past, such
an example may have been petrochemicals, where the group
has probably missed the bus. But there are some opportunities
which are still open - for example, in drugs and pharmaceuticals,
and in plastics. We need to look at these opportunities
closely. And we also need to decide whether Tata Industries
itself wants to undertake such projects, or merely act
as a catalyst, and pass on ideas to other group companies."
Clearly, Bhinge has the most interesting corporate planning
assignment today in India.
"We'll have a crack
at the New Era"
On this busy days, 52 year old Ratan Tata, Chairman
of Tata Industries and Telco, sometimes has to attend
as many as three board meetings, one annual general
meeting, six important conferences with operating managers,
and perhaps, round it off with a business trip that
could take him to Jamshedpur, Pune or Delhi, or even
as far away as Singapore, Australia, Japan, Los Angeles,
New York or Europe. Talking to Tata is, therefore, both
pleasant and problematic: pleasant because he seldom
hedges questions, displays great clarity of vision,
and infectiously communicates his strong and positive
beliefs; problematic because one seldom gets an uninterrupted
hour to talk to him. BusinessWorld pieced together his
comments on a number of issues over a number of short
sessions. Excerpts :
On strategic planning in the Tata group
After our last exercise in the early eighties, it was
intended that policy groups for each of the business
areas identified for growth would meet on an ongoing
basis. This has not happened. With several Tata Industries'
projects getting the go ahead, the people doing the
nitty-gritties of the planning exercise got involved
as operating managers and strategic planning took a
back seat.
Nevertheless, there are a lot of areas which we may
be missing out on. Strategic planning should be an ongoing
exercise, not a one-off thing. Today, therefore, we
are making another effort and taking a relook at the
possibilities open to us in the light of our potentials.
On the future of Tata Industries, which has promoted
several new projects.
Thinking about this would be part of the strategic planning
exercise. But a general comment would be that we must
try and make Tata Industries a more attractive company
for its shareholders and provide better investment returns.
We have to consider whether we can try out the acquisition
mode, i.e. get companies which have positive cash flow
and profits. But we would definitely continue to pursue
the goal of hi-tech.
On his interactions with government.
One task which I have liked a great deal is working
for the science and technology ministry. I was part
of a technology mission to the US, where the effort
was to set up a venture capital company in that country
which could buy into hi-tech companies. The model would
roughly be what the Tatas did with Elxsi (a Singapore-based
Tata outfit; see main story). I am in the process of
preparing some notes about this for the government.
On the Tatas seven or 10 years hence.
I do not envisage any change in the character of the
group. We shall continue as a loose confederation with
strong operating chiefs in charge of and responsible
for their comapnies. And the value system is bound to
survive-there are enough people, who may not be immediately
visible to the outside world, but who all subscribe
to and uphold these fundamental values.
I am confident that the Tata culture will remain very
strong in the hands of these people - low visibility,
non-flamboyance and an effort to expand business but
retain ideals at the same time. If it is acceptable
to the government, we would not only have a crack at
a new era, but also become more structured in terms
of a central core plan.
On the future of Telco, the first major Tata company
he heads
The late Sumant Moolgaokar has bequeathed us a grand
legacy. Telco did not have to modernise, but under Moolgaokar's
inspiration, the company continually upgraded, sought
new technologies and international standards. It is
now for us to follow through this path. Organisationally,
the company is functional enough; but so far, it has
been a single product, virtually a single model company.
Today, the product profile has changed - now there are
medium commercial vehicles, light commercial vehicles,
and cars. We may have to adapt ourselves, accordingly,
to more of a multi-divisional structure. Also, our Pune
and Jamshedpur factories may each concentrate on their
respective strengths - Pune on light commercial vehicles
and cars, and Jamshedpur on medium and heavy commercial
vehicles.
On Telco's labour problems
The company has, perhaps, taken its workers for granted
for far too long. As a result, much distrust has sprung
up. Trust will have to be earned
again by both sides. This will be my effort for the
future.
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